DEEP DIVE ยท 08

Security & governance
the complete guide

What the CFO and general counsel want to know before rolling out Claude. Data retention, SSO, SOC 2, Japan residency. The 15-minute incident playbook. And the new approval-fatigue section that treats mindless click-through as a design problem, not a willpower problem.

Enterprise ZDR SSO / SCIM APPI / GDPR / HIPAA

1. Data retention and zero data retention

Default retention policy

Anthropic's default retention window for commercial customers is 30 days. API inputs and outputs are deleted automatically. Conversations through Claude Team and Enterprise stay until a user explicitly deletes them, and once deleted they're purged from the backend within 30 days.

Exceptions:

  • Usage-policy violations: up to 2 years
  • Safety classification scores tied to violations: up to 7 years
  • Legal or contractual hold: custom periods

Zero data retention (ZDR)

With ZDR, customer data is dropped from memory after the API response is returned and nothing is persisted โ€” except for what's needed to meet law-enforcement or abuse-prevention obligations.

ScopeCovered / not covered
ZDR coversClaude Messages API, Token Counting API, Claude Code (via API key and via Claude Enterprise)
ZDR does not coverConsole, Workbench (web UI), Claude Consumer (Free / Pro / Max), Claude Teams, Claude Enterprise UI (except Claude Code), third-party integrations such as Bedrock and Vertex AI

Enablement: contact the Anthropic sales team. They verify eligibility and turn ZDR on per organization. Switching it on automatically disables certain features that need conversation history to work.

The commercial-terms guarantee

Anthropic's commercial terms state in writing that customer content is not used to train models. Inputs and outputs from commercial customers never end up in the permanent model-improvement pipeline.

For executives: ZDR is a contractual option, not a default. If MIXI wants it, ask the Anthropic account team explicitly and get the confirmation in writing. Any team that uses Console or Workbench is outside ZDR coverage โ€” worth knowing before someone assumes they're protected.

2. Identity and access (SSO, SCIM, MFA, RBAC)

Single sign-on (SSO)

Claude Enterprise supports SAML 2.0 and OIDC. Supported IdPs:

  • Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)
  • Google Workspace
  • Okta
  • Ping Identity
  • Any standards-compliant SAML or OIDC IdP

Enforcement options:

  • Require SSO for Console โ€” admins must sign in via SSO
  • Require SSO for Claude โ€” end users must sign in via SSO
  • MFA policy is inherited from the IdP automatically

SCIM user provisioning

SCIM directory sync is Enterprise-only. When you add or remove a user in the IdP, Claude follows within seconds. Remove a user in the IdP and their access dies across web, desktop, and CLI at the same time. That matters on the day someone leaves.

Role-based access control (RBAC)

RolePermissions
AdminAll configuration and user management
MemberStandard Claude usage
Workspace-specific rolesPer-project delegation

Domain claim

Claim your corporate email domain and any signup attempt from that domain gets routed into the Enterprise workspace. It's the cleanest way to kill shadow IT on personal accounts.

3. Audit and compliance (SOC 2, ISO, HIPAA, GDPR, PIPA)

Certifications

CertificationScopeNotes
SOC 2 Type I & IIAnthropic corp12-month observation window, five trust criteria audited by an independent party
ISO 27001:2022Information security managementAPI infrastructure, customer data processing, internal access control
ISO/IEC 42001:2023AI management systemAI security and quality management
HIPAA-readyAPI layer (BAA required)For organizations handling protected health information

Enterprise customers can pull SOC 2 Type II reports and ISO certificates from the Anthropic Trust Portal under NDA.

GDPR and DPA

Anthropic provides a Data Processing Addendum to customers subject to GDPR. Standard Contractual Clauses are included. Accepting the commercial terms pulls in the DPA automatically.

HIPAA (healthcare)

Once a Business Associate Agreement is signed, the Claude API exposes a HIPAA-ready surface. Customers handling PHI get a separately provisioned HIPAA-enabled organization.

Note: Claude Code is not covered by HIPAA. API only.

Japan (APPI)

Anthropic processes personal information in line with Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information. The Japan entity is Anthropic Japan GK. Personal information is held on secure servers with encryption and access restrictions in place.

4. Japan data residency

Direct API (Anthropic-hosted)

Anthropic's direct Claude API (api.anthropic.com) runs in US and Global regions only. There's no Tokyo region. If you've got a legal or contractual requirement for in-country processing, the direct API won't meet it.

The trap for MIXI: PoCs start on the direct API because it's the fastest path. Then they slide into production and โ€” suddenly โ€” your data leaves Japan. If in-country processing is a hard requirement for the workload, the answer is AWS Bedrock ap-northeast-1 or Vertex AI Tokyo. Decide before the PoC, not after.

AWS Bedrock ap-northeast-1 (recommended)

Verified 2026-04-20: Claude Opus 4.7 is generally available in AWS Bedrock Tokyo (ap-northeast-1) for production use.

Regional behaviour:

  • ap-northeast-1 โ€” Tokyo data centre
  • Cross-region inference profiles keep traffic within US, EU, Japan, or Australia
  • Quota increases have to be requested from the region you need them in

Available models:

  • Claude Opus 4.7 (latest)
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5 / 4.6
  • Claude Haiku 4.5

Google Cloud Vertex AI (Tokyo)

Vertex AI supports both multi-region endpoints (dynamic routing across regions) and regional endpoints pinned to a single region. Pin it to Tokyo and processing stays in Japan.

Note: when you integrate directly with Vertex, Google Cloud's DPA applies, not Anthropic's.

5. API key management โ€” the essentials

We have a whole page on API keys. For the full walkthrough, see the API key hygiene guide. Here are just the governance-level bits.

Secret managers

ToolBest fitMIXI recommendation
AWS Secrets ManagerDynamic fetch in Lambda, EC2, ECSโ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…
1PasswordTeam sharing plus audit logsโ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…
DopplerCI/CD and env-var syncโ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜†
HashiCorp VaultOn-prem and hybridโ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜…โ˜†

Don't:

  • Hard-code keys or commit them
  • Paste them into Slack, email, or shared docs
  • Keep long-lived keys with no rotation
  • Share admin keys across people

Rotation schedule

Rotate every 90 days, or immediately on detected leak.

Staged rotation, five steps:

  1. Generate the new key, store in Secrets Manager
  2. Update app env vars to the new key (canary first)
  3. Run old and new in parallel for 7 days
  4. Disable the old key
  5. Confirm retirement at the monthly review

Scope minimisation

One key, one purpose.

  • PROD_API_KEY โ€” production only, read/write
  • STAGING_API_KEY โ€” staging, read-only (optional)
  • CI_CD_KEY โ€” GitHub Actions or GitLab Runner, scoped to the project
  • LOCAL_DEV_KEY โ€” per-developer, 30-day expiry on dev machines

Audit logs

The Claude Enterprise dashboard records every key operation. Check monthly:

  • Key creation and deletion history
  • Anomalous call patterns โ€” geography, rate, error percentage
  • Unused keys flagged for retirement

6. Incident response โ€” the 15-minute playbook

What counts as an incident

Any of these triggers a 15-minute response:

  • API key accidentally committed to a repo
  • GitHub public repo exposure caught by an automated scanner
  • Cost spike โ€” 5x or more week-over-week
  • API calls from an unexpected geography
  • Suspected prompt injection (Anthropic abuse report)
  • Unauthorized tool execution or file access by Claude Code

The 15-minute playbook

The trap for MIXI โ€” drill the playbook in peacetime: with a leaked API key, the damage is a function of how many minutes pass before you stop the bleeding. Print the table below and pin it at the security lead's desk and the dev lead's desk. Two drills a year. Anthropic support gets slow during outages, so run T+3 escalation and T+5 revocation in parallel, not sequentially.
TimeOwnerActionDeliverable
T+0DetectorIncident report in Slack #security-alertsShort written report
T+3Security leadEscalate to Anthropic support ([email protected])Support ticket ID
T+5Dev leadRevoke or disable the suspect key from Console immediatelyRevocation confirmed
T+7AuditorPull last 24h of API logs, check for anomalies (who called what)Log analysis report
T+10Security leadUpdate all teams; decide on exec notificationRisk assessment
T+15Named ownerGenerate and deploy new keys; lock in the rotation scheduleRecovery plan

Anthropic contacts

7. Prompt injection countermeasures

The trap for MIXI โ€” the new Agent-era risk: prompt injection isn't just a human typing malicious instructions to an AI. In Anthropic's own production data, around 90% of Agent incidents come from tool-output injection โ€” attacks embedded in Web fetch results, MCP server responses, and API payloads. Conventional WAF and SAST won't catch this. You need a three-layer defence: Model, System, and Operational.

Known attack vectors

Per Anthropic's production research, roughly 90% of Agent incidents originate from tool-output injection.

VectorShareExample
Direct prompt10%A user types malicious instructions straight into Claude
Tool-output injection50%+Instructions embedded in API responses or Web fetch results
MCP server poisoning20%+An untrusted MCP server returns malicious payloads
Config and env poisoning10%+ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL overridden to an attacker endpoint; Hooks or MCP config tampered with

Claude Code defences

Permission-based architecture:

  • Read-only by default โ€” file writes and command execution require explicit permission
  • /sandbox isolates bash runs (filesystem and network restrictions)
  • Command blocklist โ€” curl, wget, and other arbitrary-content fetchers are blocked by default

Cowork (remote collaboration) restrictions:

  • Trust Verification prompt when cloning untrusted repos
  • File watch โ€” no writes above the parent directory
  • Network request approval โ€” external API calls need pre-authorisation

MIXI-recommended three-layer defence

LayerControls
Layer 1 โ€” ModelUse Claude Sonnet 4.5 or later (improved attack detection)
Layer 2 โ€” SystemAllowlist MCP servers from trusted providers only; run Claude Code inside a VM or devcontainer
Layer 3 โ€” OperationalLog all API calls to CloudWatch; monthly anomaly-detection dashboard; code review for risk assessment

8. Model training implications

Default behaviour

Anthropic does not train models on commercial customer inputs or outputs โ€” it's in the commercial terms in writing. Two exceptions:

  • User Safety classifier results (abuse-detection scores) โ€” retained and used
  • Aggregated, de-identified patterns โ€” usable for improvement research

Enterprise opt-out

With ZDR, the guarantees tighten further:

  • Inputs and outputs are deleted from storage after the API response returns
  • User Safety classification is also deleted unless a policy-violation flag fires

Consumer vs commercial

SurfaceTraining useWhere to check
Claude Free / Pro / MaxPossible โ€” user can opt out in privacy settingsclaude.ai/settings/privacy
Claude API (commercial)NoAutomatic; confirmed in ZDR contract
Claude Code DesktopNoConfirmed via org-level ZDR
For executives: a common failure mode is an exec using a personal claude.ai (Free / Pro / Max) account for internal work. Under default settings, that content can land in training. Consolidate exec licences under a Team or Enterprise tenant, turn on Require SSO for Claude, and shadow IT goes away.

9. Network and transport (TLS, IP allowlisting, mTLS)

TLS encryption

All traffic to the Claude API runs over TLS. Encryption strength is industry standard.

  • API endpoint โ€” api.anthropic.com (HTTPS only)
  • Remote Control sessions โ€” TLS over a streaming connection (local session routes messages through the Anthropic API)

Egress IP restrictions

Claude Enterprise supports IP allowlisting.

  • Admins set an allowed-IP list in Organization settings
  • Authentication attempts from client IPs outside that list get blocked

Example: only the MIXI HQ LAN segment 203.0.113.0/24 can authenticate.

Corporate proxy and mTLS

Enterprise deployments can configure the following via environment variables:

  • HTTP proxy for outbound traffic
  • Custom Certificate Authority (CA) trust
  • mTLS client certificates for mutual authentication

Watch out for

  • WebDAV on Windows is Microsoft-deprecated โ€” avoid
  • Package manager access (npm, PyPI) can be scoped to allowed domains, but token exfiltration risk remains โ€” minimise credentials

10. Enterprise procurement

DPA and BAA signing

StepDurationOwner
Initial sales contactSame dayAnthropic account team
Scope definition2โ€“3 daysLegal + InfoSec + Sales
DPA / BAA draft delivered1โ€“2 daysAnthropic Legal
Internal legal review5โ€“7 daysMIXI Legal
Redlines and negotiation7โ€“14 daysAnthropic Legal + MIXI Legal
Signature and execution1โ€“2 daysApprover and signatory

Standard DPA includes Anthropic's Standard Contractual Clauses.

InfoSec questionnaire / RFI

Anthropic provides:

  • SOC 2 Type II report (under NDA)
  • ISO 27001 and ISO 42001 certificates
  • HIPAA Implementation Guide (when HIPAA is in scope)
  • Penetration test summary on request

Recommended process:

  1. Submit your security questionnaire to Anthropic (any standard template works)
  2. Anthropic compliance team typically responds within 3โ€“5 business days
  3. Take the response to the internal information security board for review

Typical review timelines

Contract typeTimeline
Lightweight (no ZDR)2โ€“3 weeks
Standard (ZDR + baseline compliance)4โ€“6 weeks
Complex (HIPAA + custom SLA)8โ€“12 weeks

Start the Anthropic sales conversation early and kick off legal in parallel.

For executives: this guide is reference material for the MIXI exec team's AI adoption decision. Final sign-off should come from Legal and InfoSec before production use.
HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP

11. Approval fatigue โ€” the human-in-the-loop problem

Every executive who tries Claude Code surfaces the same worry within a week. "I'm going to press Approve so many times that eventually I'll stop reading what's in the diff." It's not paranoia. It happens. Human attention drops off sharply inside a 30-minute session. Approval dialog number forty isn't being read โ€” it's being clicked.

And that habituation is where the security risk lives. One backdoor line dropped into a larger diff gets Accepted without a glance.

Five mitigations

Mitigation 01

Lead with Plan mode

Instead of approving 40 per-change diffs, read the Plan carefully once at the start, then let Auto Accept run. Brain engaged on the design review, not on every edit. Individual changes become a spot-check for drift from the plan, nothing more.

Mitigation 02

Write the auto-approve boundary down

In settings.json, make it explicit: "read-only auto-approves, write or execute always asks". Draw the line in code and you don't have to draw it in willpower. Example: allow: Read, Grep, Glob / ask: Edit, Write, Bash.

Mitigation 03

Diff-size gate

Any diff over 20 lines โ€” you read it. Over 100 โ€” ask Claude to summarise first, then decide. A numeric rule removes the "I'm tired" excuse, because the number doesn't care how you feel.

Mitigation 04

End-of-session sweep

Before closing out, run git diff HEAD~N and read the full session's changes as a single diff. Stuff you waved through per-action sometimes looks off when you zoom out. Problems you missed in the moment tend to surface here.

Mitigation 05

Red-team drill (monthly)

Mid-session, deliberately ask Claude to "embed an opaque base64 string in this file" or "slip in admin-privileged code calling an external API". If you approve it without noticing, that's your fatigue threshold. Untrained, it only gets worse.

Exec KPIs

Make approval quality visible as numbers and abstract worry turns into an operational problem you can actually fix.

KPITargetHow to measure
Post-merge defect rate on Claude-authored PRs<2%Monthly pull of merged PRs cross-referenced with the bug tracker
Post-approval revert rate<5%Claude-generated commits reverted within 30 days
Red-team detection rate80%+Share of monthly-drill traps that got caught
Average approvals per sessionUnder 20High numbers mean Plan mode isn't doing its job
Structure over willpower: every approval is accepting responsibility. Build a team culture that takes a breath before the click. And when click-through starts creeping up, don't write a memo about vigilance โ€” rebuild the structure (Plan mode, stricter boundaries) so the click isn't needed. Operations that depend on willpower fail. Always.

12. Official sources

Everything here traces back to the Anthropic documentation and Trust Center materials below. Last verified 2026-04-22.

Based on information as of 2026-04-21. Anthropic ships fast โ€” features, pricing, and compliance scope can change without notice.

Last verified: 2026-04-22
Sources: